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his Article reviews legislative and case law developments in the
areas of wills, nontestamentary transfers, heirship, estate adminis-
tration, guardianships, nter vivos gifts, and trusts. The Survey pe-
riod covers decisions published between October 1, 1996, and September
30, 1997, and changes to the Probate Code, the Property Code, and other
codes and statutes enacted by the 75th Texas Legislature that affect the
areas of probate and trusts.
I. WILLS
A. WILL CONTESTS
In Sanders v. Capitol Area Council, Boy Scouts of America,' the court
held that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment on a basis
not included in the motion for summary judgment.2 The decedent cre-
ated an irrevocable trust, under the terms of which she was the benefici-
ary during her lifetime and her daughter, as her only heir, held a
successor beneficial interest after the decedent's death. The decedent
purported to transfer all of her property to the trust. The trust agreement
provided that the decedent had the power to change the interests of the
successor beneficiary. The decedent later executed a will in which she left
her ranch (which she theoretically transferred into the trust) to charity, a
small sum of money to her daughter, and the remainder of her estate to
other persons. The decedent also apparently altered the trust agreement
by drawing a line through the designation of the secondary beneficiary of
the trust and initialling the change. The decedent, however, failed to
change the designation of her legal heirs as the remainder beneficiaries or
to change the designation of her heirs as the secondary beneficiaries in
another article of the trust agreement. Following the decedent's death,
the charity attempted to probate the will and the decedent's daughter
contested the will. The decedent's daughter also sought, in a separate
proceeding, to have the validity of the trust established and a declaration
that the trust assets passed to her under the terms of the trust agreement.
The charity responded by requesting that the court declare the trust inva-
lid, or, if the court declared the trust valid, that the charity became the
secondary beneficiary of the trust through the decedent's execution of
her will. The trial court consolidated the actions.
The charity moved for summary judgment based on two theories: (1)
that the decedent never transferred the ranch to the trust, so that the
charity took the ranch under the terms of the will; and (2) that the dece-
dent exercised her retained power to change the beneficial interest of the
secondary beneficiary through the execution of her will. However, the
charity did not assert in its motion for summary judgment that the dece-
dent exercised her power to change the beneficial interest of the secon-
1. 930 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, no writ).
2. See id. at 911.
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dary beneficiary by drawing the line through the designation in the trust
agreement. The daughter objected to the charity's motion for summary
judgment and the charity, in its reply, referenced the notation on the trust
agreement for the first time. The trial court granted summary judgment
for the charity on the basis that the decedent changed the secondary ben-
eficiary by striking out the designation of the secondary beneficiary in the
trust agreement, a ground that the charity did not include in its motion
for summary judgment. The daughter filed a motion for new trial, alleg-
ing that the trial court granted summary judgment on a basis not included
in the charity's motion for summary judgment. The trial court overruled
the motion and admitted the will to probate. The daughter, in her appeal,
again asserted that the trial court granted its summary judgment on a
ground not included in the charity's motion. The appeals court found
that the charity did not specifically raise the ground on which the trial
court granted the summary judgment by merely mentioning the ground in
its reply to the daughter's response. 3 The court held that the trial court
thus improperly granted the charity's motion for summary judgment.4
In Guthrie v. Suiter,5 the court held that fact issues precluding summary
judgment existed on the issues of testamentary capacity and testamentary
intent,6 but that no fact issues existed on the issues of undue influence 7
and fraud.8 The testator lived apart from her two sons for most of their
childhood and apparently never became close to one of them. The testa-
tor moved to Houston to be close to one of her brothers, who took care
of her affairs, some years prior to her death, and she and the brother
remained close. The testator left her entire estate in trust for the benefit
of one of her sons, who predeceased her, with a remainder to her two
surviving brothers. The testator excluded her other son entirely from her
will, specifically stating her reason for excluding this son. The testator's
son filed the will contest after the court admitted the will to probate and
appointed the testator's brother as independent executor. The son al-
leged in his will contest that the testator did not have testamentary capac-
ity, that she did not properly execute the will, that the executor unduly
influenced the testator, and that the executor procured the will by fraud.
The son offered the affidavit of a mental health expert concerning his
mother's capacity, but the trial court excluded this affidavit because the
son failed to attach sworn or certified copies of the documents to which
the expert referred in his affidavit as required under Rule 166a(f). 9 The
trial court refused to consider two letters attached to the son's affidavit
3. See id. The court found that the charity's reply mentioned the decedent's notation
on the trust agreement only in support of its contention that the decedent exercised her
power to change the beneficial interest through the execution of her will. See id.
4. See id.
5. 934 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ).
6. See id. at 831.
7. See id. at 832.
8. See id. at 833.
9. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(f).
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under the ancient documents exception to the hearsay rule.10 The trial
court also refused to consider the copy of the executor's deposition that
the son attached to his motion for summary judgment because the son did
not direct the court to the pertinent pages of the lengthy deposition. The
trial court granted the executor's motion for summary judgment on each
cause of action. The appeals court upheld the trial court's rulings on ex-
cluding the son's evidence." However, the appeals court found that the
son provided some evidence that the testator may not have had testamen-
tary capacity, therefore, the trial court improperly granted summary judg-
ment on the testamentary capacity issue.12 The son argued that the
testator could not form the requisite intent to execute her will. The ap-
peals court again found that a fact issue existed concerning the testator's
ability to form the necessary testamentary intent and that the trial court
improperly granted summary judgment.13 The appeals court, however,
found that the circumstantial evidence concerning the testator's relation-
ship with her brother did not raise a factual issue concerning undue influ-
ence.14 The appeals court also found that no factual question existed
concerning whether the executor fraudulently induced the testator to exe-
cute the will by misleading her concerning the contents of her will. 15
In In re Estate of McDaniel,'6 the court held that a will beneficiary
could not contest the will after accepting benefits under the will.' 7 The
testator made several gifts to various individuals in his will, left his son a
life estate in some rental property, and left his daughter the residue of his
estate. The testator named his daughter as independent executor, and the
court admitted the will to probate and appointed the daughter executor.
The daughter delivered an executor's deed to her brother, in which she
conveyed the life estate in the rental property to him. The son filed the
deed and received all of the rents from the property after his father's
death. Several months after filing the deed, the son filed a contest of the
will, alleging that his father lacked testamentary capacity. The daughter
filed two pleas in abatement, alleging that the son's receipt of benefits
estopped him from contesting the will and that the son had no standing to
contest the will because of estoppel. The trial court sustained the daugh-
ter's pleas in abatement and dismissed the contest. The appeals court
10. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 803(16).
11. See Guthrie, 934 S.W.2d at 824-26.
12. See id. at 830-31. The son offered evidence of the testator's mental ability from
both before and after she executed the will.
13. See id. at 831.
14. See id. at 832. The court found that circumstantial evidence sufficient only to raise
the mere "surmise that the executor unduly influenced the testator" was insufficient to
raise a factual question concerning undue influence. Id. (citing Mackie v. McKenzie, 900
S.W.2d 445, 450-51 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995, writ denied)).
15. See Guthrie, 934 S.W.2d at 833. The court found that claims of undue influence
and fraud in the inducement actually constitute one claim, so no factual issue concerning
fraud existed. See id. (citing Holcomb v. Holcomb, 803 S.W.2d 411, 415 (Tex. App.- Dal-
las 1991, writ denied)).
16. 935 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, writ denied).
17. See id. at 830.
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affirmed the trial court.18
B. WILL CONSTRUCTION
In Montgomery v. Browder,19 the court held that a decedent could not
transfer the remainder interest in her life estate by will,20 although the
decedent had broad powers of sale and use during her lifetime, and that
payments due on a promissory note due subsequent to the decedent's
death belonged to the remaindermen. 21 The decedent's sister, in her will,
gave the beneficiary a life estate in her property, including the real prop-
erty at issue in this case. The sister provided that the decedent could use
sums necessary for her maintenance and support from the corpus of the
life estate and that the decedent would have all of the powers of fee sim-
ple ownership except the disposal of the remainder interest. The dece-
dent entered a contract for the sale of certain real estate in which she had
a life estate. The consideration for the contract included a cash payment
at closing and a promissory note providing for annual interest payments
with full principal due within fifteen years of the date of closing. The
contract further provided that the decedent would execute a will in which
she would forgive the indebtedness owing at her death. The warranty
deed, deed of trust and promissory note contained no mention of the for-
giveness of the indebtedness. The decedent executed a codicil, which did
not qualify for probate in her state of residence at the time of her death,
but did purport to forgive the indebtedness. The purchasers never at-
tempted to contact the remainder beneficiaries about purchasing their in-
terests in the property. When the purchasers learned of the decedent's
death two years later, they withheld future payments under the note.
The remaindermen sued for the unpaid amounts of the note, foreclo-
sure of the lien under the deed of trust, and other damages. The remain-
dermen alleged that the purchasers were in default for failing to make
payments under the note. The remaindermen argued that the note was a
substitute for the real property and, thus, was part of the decedent's life
estate, which passed to the remaindermen upon her death. The purchas-
ers argued that the decedent had the right to forgive the note in her will
and that her agreement to do so was part of the consideration for the
purchase of the property. They also argued that the decedent breached
18. See id. at 830. The court held that all of the elements of legal estoppel are not
necessary to estop a person from contesting a will under which he has already received
benefits. See id. at 829-30. The court found unpersuasive the son's argument that he did
not know that accepting any benefits under the will would estop him from contesting the
will. See id. at 829. The court also found unpersuasive the son's argument that the daugh-
ter did not detrimentally rely upon his acceptance of benefits under the will. See id. at 829-
30. The court stated that the only element necessary for estopping a beneficiary from
contesting a will is the beneficiary's acceptance of "a benefit under the will of which he
could have been legally deprived without his consent." Id. at 830 (citing Wright v. Wright,
274 S.W.2d 670, 676 (Tex. 1955)).
19. 930 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996, writ denied).
20. See id. at 778.
21. See id. at 779.
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the contract by failing to forgive the debt effectively in her codicil, and
that the statute of limitations22 had expired, giving them title to the prop-
erty. The trial court granted summary judgment for the remaindermen.
The appeals court first found that the testator granted the decedent
broad powers over the life estate property, but that the testator did not
give the decedent the absolute right to dispose of the property because
she limited the right to invade principal to the decedent's needs. 23 While
the decedent had the right to sell the property and use all of the proceeds
for her needs during her lifetime, she did not have the right to dispose of
the remainder interest by will.24 The court found that the contract provi-
sion forgiving the debt was illegal and the contract was void, although
neither the remaindermen nor the purchasers challenged the warranty
deed, deed of trust, or promissory note, which made no mention of the
forgiveness of indebtedness. 25 The court left "the parties as [it found]
them-with a valid warranty deed, deed of trust and promissory note."'26
The court held that the statute of limitations did not apply because the
remaindermen sought recovery under the promissory note, which was
payable by installments, rather than title to the property.27 The purchas-
ers, on motion for rehearing, contended that the decedent should have
acquired the interests of the remaindermen so that she could convey fee
simple title to the property. The court found that the decedent did not
agree to acquire the remainder interests, but only agreed to forgive the
debt at her death, so the decedent did not breach the contract.2 8
In Sammons v. Elder,29 the court construed a will to determine the tes-
tator's intent when she left her "savings account and/or savings certifi-
cate" to her two children and the residuary estate equally to her two
children and her step-daughter. 30 The decedent had several money mar-
ket accounts, certificates of deposit, and individual retirement accounts at
the time of her death. The children, who served as co-executors of the
will, filed an inventory listing all of the accounts and identifying the ac-
counts as checking accounts, money market accounts, certificates of de-
posit, and individual retirement accounts. The step-daughter contended
that none of the accounts were savings accounts or savings certificates
that passed to the two children, so that all of the accounts passed equally
to the two children and to her. The trial court determined that all but two
of these accounts fell within her meaning of "savings account and/or sav-
ings certificate" and thus passed to her two children. The trial court
found that the other two accounts passed under the residuary clause of
22. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.024 (Vernon 1986).
23. See Montgomery, 930 S.W.2d at 777.
24. See id. at 777-78.
25. See id. at 778-79.
26. Id. at 781-82.
27. See id. at 780.
28. See id. at 781.
29. 940 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, writ denied). For a discussion of other
issues in this case, see infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
30. Id. at 280-82.
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the will to the two children and the step-daughter. On appeal, the step-
daughter alleged that the trial court incorrectly found that the term "sav-
ings account and/or savings certificate" was ambiguous and erred in al-
lowing extrinsic evidence to determine the testator's intent. The appeals
court found that the trial court did not err in determining that the testator
used an ambiguous term and in allowing the admission of extrinsic evi-
dence to determine the testator's intent.31 The court also found that the
trial court did not err when it considered the frequency of the testator's
transactions in the various accounts to determine the character of the ac-
counts as savings accounts.32
In Penland v. Agnich,33 the court held that the term "lawful issue" as
used in the testator's will was unambiguous and showed the testator's
intent to include adopted descendants. 34 The testator executed his will in
1945 and died soon thereafter. The residue of the testator's estate passed
into a testamentary trust for the benefit of his wife, with the remainder
passing into two equal shares, one of which would pass equally to the
testator's brothers, or to the "lawful issue" of any of them then deceased,
and the other half passing equally to the siblings of the testator's wife, or
to "lawful issue" of any of them then deceased. The testator's wife died
in 1993. None of the testator's siblings or his wife's siblings survived. The
biological descendants of the siblings asserted that the testator did not
intend to included adopted descendants when he used the term "lawful
issue." The trustees sought construction of the will and the trial court
granted summary judgment construing the term "lawful issue" to include
adopted descendants. The biological descendants appealed, asserting
that the law in effect at the time the testator made his will provided that
adopted persons would not be considered to be children of the adoptive
parents in documents executed by third parties. The appeals court ex-
amined the will to ascertain the testator's intent and determined that the
testator intended to divide his estate among his family without regard to
blood relationships. 35 The court also found that the modifier "lawful"
before the term "issue" indicated that the testator did not intend to limit
the beneficiaries to blood relatives.36 The court concluded that, because
the will was unambiguous and revealed the testator's intent to include
adopted descendants in the term "lawful issue," the trial court appropri-
ately construed the will as a matter of law and did not err in its construc-
tion of the will.37
In Skinner v. Moore,38 the court held that the inclusion of a gift under
the section of the will containing specific bequests constituted a specific
31. See id. at 281.
32. See id. at 282. The court also held that the trial court did not err when it character-
ized the individual retirement accounts as savings accounts. See id. at 282-83.
33. 940 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, writ denied).
34. See id. at 327.
35. See id. at 327.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. 940 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1997, no writ).
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bequest rather than a gift to the residuary. 39 The testator made a codicil
to his will, in which he left some items to specific beneficiaries. He left
the common stock of his two solely owned corporations to the appellee.
He then provided, in a separate paragraph immediately following the gift
of the common stock, that he left all his rights in four sandwich shop
franchises, but he did not state to whom he left these rights. In the next
section of his will, the testator left his residuary estate equally to his chil-
dren. The children contended that their father intended for them to re-
ceive the rights in the sandwich shops since he failed to designate a
beneficiary. The appellee contended that the codicil was unambiguous
and showed the testator's intent to leave her his rights in the sandwich
shops. The trial court granted summary judgment for the appellee and
the children appealed. The appeals court held that the testator intended
to make a specific bequest of his rights in the sandwich shops because he
included this gift in the section listing specific bequests.40 The court then
determined that if the paragraph making a gift of the rights in the shops
were transposed and added to the paragraph with the gift of the stock in
the two corporations, the testator would then have unambiguously pro-
vided for a gift of the rights to the appellee. 41 The court stated, however,
that even if the gift of the rights in the shops created a patent ambiguity,
the trial court properly considered the extrinsic evidence of the attorney
who drew the codicil to show testator's intent.42 The court held that the
extrinsic evidence showed the testator's intent to give the rights in the
stock to the appellee.43
In Allen v. Talley,44 the court held that the gift of the testator's estate to
her "living brothers and sisters . . . to share and share alike" clearly
showed the testator's intent to make a gift to her siblings who survived
her.45 The testator had three brothers and two sisters living at the time
she executed her will, but only one brother and one sister who survived
her. Each of the testator's deceased siblings was survived by children.
The decedent's sister filed a motion for summary judgment asking the
court to determine that only the two surviving siblings took the testator's
estate. The son of one of the deceased siblings urged the court to deter-
mine that the anti-lapse statute 46 applied and that the shares of each de-
ceased sibling passed to his or her children. The trial court granted the
sister's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the testator's nephew
urged the court to find that the testator intended to include children of a
39. See id. at 757.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id. The attorney stated that he made a drafting error and that the gift of the
rights in the shops should have been included in the paragraph with the gift of the stock.
See id.
43. See id. at 758. The court further found that the trial court did not err by failing to
award attorney's fees to the appellee. See id.
44. 949 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1997, writ denied).
45. Id. at 62.
46. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 68 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
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deceased sibling who was living at the time the will was executed in the
division of her estate. The court of appeals examined the language of the
will to ascertain the testator's intent and determined that the testator
would not have made a gift to any of her siblings who were deceased at
the time of execution of the will. 47 The court further found that the testa-
tor showed her intent by using the phrase "share and share alike," which
would have no meaning if she intended for the share of a deceased sibling
to pass to his or her children. 48
C. ADMISSION TO PROBATE
In Marrs v. Marquis,49 the court held that the trial court inappropri-
ately admitted a will to probate because it did not establish that it had
jurisdiction.50 The appellant filed the testator's 1993 will for probate.
The appellee contested the probate of the will and, in her contest, offered
the testator's 1990 will for probate. The appellee failed to provide all of
the information required by Probate Code section 81(a) 51 in her motion.
At the hearing the appellant brought the defects in the application to the
trial court's attention, but the trial court admitted the 1990 will to pro-
bate. The appeals court found that the appellee's application for probate
failed to meet statutory requirements in several respects so that the ap-
pellee did not establish the trial court's jurisdiction over the probate of
the 1990 will. 52 The court also found that the record did not provide
proof of service of citation concerning the probate of the 1990 will, so the
trial court improperly admitted the 1990 will to probate.
53
In Lopez v. Hansen,54 the court held that sufficient evidence existed
that the purported will was not in the decedent's handwriting to support
the trial court's denial of probate. 55 Following the decedent's death, a
family friend offered her purported holographic will for probate, but also
offered evidence that the first page of the will had been altered by some-
one other than the decedent. The decedent's heirs objected to the pro-
bate and the trial court ultimately dismissed the application for probate
and entered a determination of heirship. Later, the decedent's neighbor
again offered the will for probate and the heirs again objected. The trial
court denied probate. The neighbor timely requested findings of fact and
conclusions of law, but failed to determine that the court did not provide
the findings and conclusions until the appeals transcript was prepared.
The appeals court first held that the neighbor did not comply with the
47. See Allen, 949 S.W.2d at 62.
48. Id.
49. 927 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, no writ).
50. See id. at 306.
51. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 81(a) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
52. See Marrs, 927 S.W.2d at 305.
53. See id. at 306 (citing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 128 (Vernon 1980)).
54. 947 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, n.w.h.).
55. See id. at 590.
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time requirement of Rule 297,56 so she did not preserve error for ap-
peal.5 7 The court then found that the neighbor did not provide sufficient
evidence that the will was wholly in the decedent's handwriting and af-
firmed the trial court.5 8 The dissent believed that the neighbor offered
credible and sufficient evidence that the will was wholly in the decedent's
handwriting.59
II. NONTESTAMENTARY TRANSFERS
In Woodfin v. Coleman,60 the court held that a judgment determining
the contingent payees in the event that the plaintiff did not survive until
the last payment required under the judgment was a nontestamentary in-
strument under Probate Code section 450(a)(1) 61 and that the laws of
intestate succession did not apply to the contingent payments. 62 The
plaintiff was a minor when he was injured in an accident. The plaintiff's
parents were divorced at the time of the injury and his mother, as his next
friend, brought suit for damages. The plaintiff's father was not a party to
the suit. A guardian ad litem represented the plaintiff's interests in the
suit. The parties reached a settlement, under the terms of which the
plaintiff was to receive payments on specified future dates. In the event
that the plaintiff did not survive until he received all settlement payments,
the parties agreed that the defendants would make the payments to the
plaintiff's mother and siblings. The district court entered a judgment ap-
proving the settlement. The plaintiff died before the due date of the last
payment and his father sought to have the judgment invalidated and to
have the sums due under the payment pass by the laws of intestate suc-
cession. The trial court entered summary judgment against the father,
who appealed. The appeals court found that the father could not collater-
ally attack the judgment approving the settlement. 63 The court further
found that, even if the father could collaterally attack the settlement judg-
ment, the plaintiff's estate had no interest in the final settlement payment
because the plaintiff did not survive. Thus, he did not meet the condition
precedent to receiving the final payment.64 The court added that even if
the plaintiff's estate had an interest in the final payment, the contingency
56. TEX. R. Civ. P. 297. This rule provides that a party has twenty days after the
judgment to request findings of fact and conclusions of law. If the court does not file the
findings and conclusions following the request, the party has thirty days from the original
request to file a notice with the clerk that the trial court has not done so. See TEX. R. Civ.
P. 297.
57. See Lopez, 947 S.W.2d at 589.
58. See id. at 590.
59. See id. at 590-92 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Hedges, J.). The dissent
noted that the trial court's implied finding of fact that the will was not wholly in the dece-
dent's handwriting was against the great weight of the evidence. See id. at 592.
60. 931 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, writ denied).
61. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 450(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
62. See Woodfin, 931 S.W.2d at 385.
63. See id. The court found that the district court had proper jurisdiction over the




clause in the settlement, which provided that his mother and siblings
would receive the final payment if he did not survive, was a nontestamen-
tary transfer.65
In Haas v. Voigt,6 6 the court held that the husband and one child could
not create a joint tenancy with rights of survivorship in community funds
between the husband and son without evidence of partition or the wife's
gift of her community interest to her husband and that the husband and
son could not create a joint tenancy with rights of survivorship between
them without the husband's revocation of the designation of certain ac-
counts as community property with rights of survivorship. 67 The husband
and son opened a new account, which they designated as a joint tenancy
with rights of survivorship between themselves, with the husband and
wife's community funds. The son presented no evidence that his parents
had partitioned the funds and that the husband established the account
with his partitioned, separate funds, or that the wife had made a gift of
her community interest in the funds to her husband. The husband and
wife had three existing accounts at another bank, which they had opened
as joint tenancies with rights of survivorship between themselves. Shortly
before the husband's death, he and the son executed new signature cards
on these three accounts, which provided that the accounts were joint ten-
ancies with rights of survivorship between the spouses and the son. The
husband left his estate to his wife in his will. The wife died shortly there-
after and she left her estate equally to their three children. The other two
children contended that the funds in the four accounts all passed to their
mother under the prior survivorship agreements and thus passed equally
to the three children on their mother's death. The son who was listed as a
survivor on the accounts contended that he should receive all of the funds
in the new account, as the surviving joint tenant, and one-fourth of the
funds in the other three accounts as one of the two survivors under the
signature cards. The trial court found that the husband and wife estab-
lished the accounts with the intent that the survivor of them would own
all of the funds in the account on the death of the first of them to die and
that the son caused the redesignation of the accounts to list him as a joint
tenant with survivorship rights without the knowledge and consent of his
mother. The trial court concluded that the funds in all of the accounts
passed to the mother on the father's death, then equally to the three chil-
dren under the terms of her will.
On appeal the court held that the father and son, since they were not
spouses, could not create a joint tenancy with rights of survivorship with
community property in the new account.68 The court affirmed the trial
court's judgment, finding that the funds in the account established just
prior to the father's death passed to the mother under the terms of the
65. See id.
66. 940 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied).
67. See id. at 203.
68. See id. at 202.
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father's will, then passed equally to the three children under the terms of
the mother's will.69 The court then found that since the parents did not
revoke their survivorship agreement in the three existing accounts, the
son could not acquire a survivorship interest in his father's one-half of the
funds held in the accounts.70
In Evans v. First National Bank of Bellville,71 the court held that the
trial court could consider extrinsic evidence concerning which funds were
subject to a survivorship agreement when the intent to create a survivor-
ship account or accounts was clear, but some ambiguity existed concern-
ing which accounts fell under the agreement. 72 The decedent opened a
joint checking account with her nephew and specified that the account
was a joint tenancy with rights of survivorship. The decedent later
opened a certificate of deposit with the same bank, which was issued in
the decedent's name only. On the same day the decedent took out the
certificate of deposit, she and her nephew executed a new signature card
for the time deposit, which specified that the time deposit was in the de-
cedent's name only and that the signature card covered future time de-
posits. The signature card neither listed account numbers nor stated that
it covered all certificates of deposit issued to the decedent. The bank
subsequently issued several certificates of deposit to the decedent prior to
her death. Following the death of the decedent, the court appointed her
nephew as her independent executor. The nephew listed three certifi-
cates of deposit on the inventory, and later renewed one certificate of
deposit in the estate's name. Afterwards, the nephew withdrew all funds
in the certificates of deposit, claiming the funds as the surviving joint ten-
ant. The remaining beneficiaries requested an accounting from the exec-
utor and learned that he had taken possession of the funds in the
certificates of deposit. The remaining beneficiaries sued the executor,
seeking recovery of the funds in the certificates of deposit and his re-
moval as executor. The beneficiaries also sued the bank and the
nephew's daughter, who worked at the bank, as well as the nephew's wife
and son, alleging that they conspired with the nephew to convert the
funds. The executor died shortly before the trial, and the court appointed
a successor executor in the decedent's estate. The nephew's daughter
served as executor of her father's estate, and, as such, she initiated a third
party action against the decedent's successor executor for reimbursement
of expenses the nephew incurred in defending the removal action.
The trial court granted several motions for summary judgment re-
quested by the defendants and directed a verdict in favor of the nephew's
executor on all issues except the issue of whether the nephew failed to
identify estate assets properly and whether he acted in good faith as exec-
utor. The jury found that the nephew acted in good faith and identified
69. See id. at 202-03.
70. See id.
71. 946 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ denied).
72. See id. at 375.
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estate assets, awarded no damages to the beneficiaries, and awarded at-
torneys' fees to the nephew's estate. The beneficiaries appealed. The ap-
pellees asserted that the beneficiaries had no standing to appeal because
they were not parties to the third party action against the decedent's suc-
cessor executor. The successor executor did not appeal the decision, but
the beneficiaries instead appealed.
The appeals court held that the beneficiaries had standing to appeal.73
The court then found that the signature card evidenced the decedent's
intent to create a joint tenancy with rights of survivorship in a time de-
posit held in her name, but that the card did not show which time deposits
she intended to be joint tenancies with rights of survivorship. 74 In addi-
tion, the signature card, while unambiguous on its face, was ambiguous
when considered with the three certificates of deposit. 75 The court held
that a trial court may not consider extrinsic evidence as to whether the
parties intended to create a joint tenancy with rights of survivorship, but
may consider extrinsic evidence concerning what funds fall under a survi-
vorship agreement if an ambiguity concerning the identity of the funds
exists. 76 Because the beneficiaries presented a fact issue, the trial court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of the nephew concerning the funds
covered by the survivorship agreement was improper.77 The court upheld
the summary judgments in favor of the bank and the nephew's daughter
because the trial court did not specify the specific grounds on which it
based the summary judgments and the appellants did not negate all of the
grounds raised by the bank and the nephew's daughter in their motions. 78
The court held that the trial court erred in directing a verdict against the
beneficiaries on their claims concerning the nephew's breach of his fiduci-
ary duties, since the claims centered on the issues concerning the certifi-
cates of deposit as to which the trial court had granted summary
judgment.79
III. HEIRSHIP
In Little v. Smith,80 the Texas Supreme Court held that an adoptee
could not use the discovery rule to assert a right to inheritance from her
73. See id. at 373. The court found that the beneficiaries had the right to appeal be-
cause they were aggrieved parties injured by the trial court's judgment. See id. The court
also found that the beneficiaries had standing to bring the initial action against the nephew.
See id.
74. See id. at 374. The court found that the signature card contained no information
identifying which time deposits it would cover. See id.
75. See id. at 375.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 376-77.
78. See id. at 377-78.
79. See id. at 379-80. The court noted that the beneficiaries could not bring forth any
evidence concerning the nephew's actions with respect to the certificates of deposit, which
limited their ability to show that the nephew may have breached his fiduciary duty. See id.
The court also held that the trial court should consider the beneficiaries' other claims
against the nephew. See id. at 380.
80. 943 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1997).
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natural grandmother8 l and that the discovery rule did not apply to deriv-
ative claims against the executor and beneficiaries for such things as
fraud, gross negligence, and conspiracy.82 The appellant was adopted
shortly after her birth in 1932. She knew of her adoption from the time
she was about ten years old, but she did not seek the identity of her natu-
ral parents until approximately 1987. She learned the identity of her nat-
ural parents in 1989, and then obtained copies of probate records,
including a copy of the will of her biological grandmother, who died in
1982. The grandmother's son served as executor of her will and he closed
the estate by affidavit in 1983. The appellant brought action against the
executor in 1991, almost eight years after the estate closed, claiming a
right to one-twelfth of the estate and seeking actual and punitive damages
for fraud, gross negligence, and conspiracy against the executor and the
other beneficiaries under the will. The trial court entered summary judg-
ment for the defendants on the basis that the statute of limitations had
expired. The court of appeals held that the statute of limitations barred
the appellant's claim for an interest in her grandmother's estate, but that
the discovery rule applied to her claims for fraud, gross negligence, and
conspiracy.83
The Supreme Court weighed the competing interests of the right of
adoptees to inherit from their biological parents, the statutory confidenti-
ality concerning the identity of biological parents, and the state's interest
in the finality of probate proceedings.8 4 The Court determined that the
policies protecting the identity of biological parents and preserving the
finality of probate proceedings outweighed an adoptee's rights to inherit
from his or her biological parents, so the discovery rule could not apply to
prolong the period in which an adoptee could bring an action asserting
inheritance rights.8 5 The Court further held that the same reasoning bars
any derivative claims against the personal representative of the estate of
the biological ancestor and the other heirs or beneficiaries of the estate.86
The Court stated that "The discovery rule should not be applied to claims
against an executor, administrator, or heir for failure to seek out or find
an adopted child."'87 The Court concluded that an adoptee must bring
"claims for inheritance and any derivative claims ... within the statutory
limitations periods. '88
81. See id. at 420.
82. Id. at 420, 423.
83. Smith v. Little, 903 S.W.2d 780, 786-88 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 943 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1997). For a discussion of this opinion, see Lynne
McNiel Candler, Probate and Trusts, 49 SMU L. REV. 1245, 1257-58 (1996).
84. See Little, 943 S.W.2d at 417-20.
85. See id. at 420.
86. See id.
87. Id. at 422.
88. Id. at 423. The concurrence noted that the statute of limitations barred the appel-
lant's causes of action, but would have also held that the appellant could not assert the
discovery rule because of the constructive notice found in all probate proceedings. See id.
at 423-25 (Enoch, J., concurring).
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In Estate of York,89 the court held that a mother's interest in her son's
estate and in an heirship proceeding in his estate survived the mother's
death and that the mother's estate included a property interest in her
son's estate.90 The son died testate, leaving all of his assets in trust for the
benefit of his mother during her lifetime, then to two friends. The two
friends timely disclaimed all of their remainder interest in the trust. Ap-
proximately four years after the son's death a young man filed a determi-
nation of heirship proceeding, in which he claimed to be the son's
illegitimate child. The mother opposed the young man's claims and as-
serted her own claims as the son's sole heir. The mother died prior to the
determination of heirship and her executor continued pursuit of her
claims. The trial court determined that the executor was not an inter-
ested party and had no standing in the heirship proceeding. The executor
was also named the trustee of a charitable trust under the terms of the
mother's will and would receive the assets held in the son's testamentary
trust as part of the trust estate, so the executor attempted to pursue the
mother's claims in its capacity as trustee. The trial court again ruled that
the trustee was not an interested party.
The appeals court determined that the disclaimer of the remainder in-
terest created a lapse of the gift to the trust upon the mother's death
because the son made no contingent disposition of his estate.91 The trust
corpus, the court reasoned, passed to the son's estate upon his mother's
death and then passed by intestate succession.92 The court found that a
determination of heirship must be made as of the time of the decedent's
death and that, since the mother survived her son, the mother was an
interested person in her son's estate.93 The court found that the mother
could have devised her interest in her son's estate and that her interest in
the heirship proceeding did not terminate with her death.94 The court
held that the mother's executor had standing to represent her interests in
the heirship proceeding and to contest the claims of the son's purported
illegitimate child. 95
In Cantu v. Sapenter,96 the court held that the statute of limitations
barred the heirship claims of two purported children of the decedent.
97
The decedent died in 1982. His widow never instituted administration of
his estate. Four years after the husband's death, the widow conveyed the
decedent's real property to third parties. One of the decedent's pur-
ported children, whom his widow believed to be the decedent's biological
son, died in 1986. No one filed an heirship action until 1993, when the
decedent's purported daughter initiated a determination that she and the
89. 934 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied).
90. See id. at 850-52.
91. See id. at 849-50.
92. See id. at 850.
93. See id. (citing Sellers v. Powers, 426 S.W.2d 533, 537 (Tex. 1968)).
94. See id. at 850.
95. See id.
96. 937 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied).
97. See id. at 551.
1998] 1297
SMU LAW REVIEW
purported son were the decedent's heirs. The trial court determined that
the two purported children were the decedent's heirs, causing the widow
and the purchasers of the real property to appeal. The appeals court bal-
anced the rights of an illegitimate child with the state's interest in deter-
mining title to property and in the "orderly administration of estates."98
The court found that the four-year residuary statute of limitations ap-
plied.99 The court further found that the purported daughter and the
heirs of the purported son were aware of their purported parentage,
knew of the death of the decedent, and knew of his property, yet they
took no action until more than ten years after his death. 100 The court
further found that the purported heirs had constructive notice of the sale
of the property constituting part of the decedent's estate when the widow
recorded the deed in which she conveyed the property to the third par-
ties. 10 1 The court found that the purported heirs could not have filed
their action prior to September 1, 1987,102 at which time their statute of
limitations accrued. 103 Because the purported heirs did not file their de-




In Estate of Crawford v. Town of Flower Mound, 05 the court held that
the county in which real property was located had exclusive jurisdiction
over suits for delinquent ad valorem taxes. 10 6 The decedent owned real
property in Denton County at the time of his death. A Dallas County
probate court appointed the executor of the decedent's will after admit-
ting the will to probate. The executor paid the ad valorem taxes on the
Denton County property for several years, then ceased payment. The
city brought suit in district court in Denton County seeking recovery of
the unpaid taxes, costs, and penalties. The executor did not receive ser-
vice of citation for several years after the city filed the suit. The executor
made a special appearance and requested that the district court dismiss
the suit for lack of jurisdiction. The district court entered judgment
against the estate and ordered foreclosure on the liens. The executor re-
quested the Dallas County probate court to enter a temporary restraining
order and a temporary injunction on the foreclosure pending appeal,
98. Id. at 552-53.
99. See id. at 553 (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.051 (Vernon
1986)).
100. See Cantu, 937 S.W.2d at 553.
101. See id.
102. The Legislature amended TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42(b) (Vernon Supp. 1998) in
1987 to provide purported heirs with a right to have their heirship determined. Act of June
17, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 464, § l(b), 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 2051.
103. See Cantu, 937 S.W.2d at 553.
104. See id.
105. 933 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth, 1996, writ denied).
106. See id. at 730-31.
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which the Dallas County probate court granted. The appeals court noted
that the Tax Code 107 and the Probate Code10 8 were in conflict concerning
proper jurisdiction.' 0 9 The court determined that the Tax Code provi-
sions must prevail over the Probate Code provisions. 110 The court also
held that the executor and the estate failed to preserve error on the issue
of proper parties because the executor did not specifically plead that the
city could not sue the estate, but could only sue the personal representa-
tive of the estate."'
In Estate of C.M. v. S.G., 1 2 the court held that the trial court did not
have jurisdiction to enter judgment against a decedent's estate. 113 The
appellees sued the estate and the decedent's husband for negligence and
gross negligence. The decedent's husband served as executor of her es-
tate, but the appellees did not name him in his fiduciary capacity as a
defendant. The trial court entered judgment against both the husband,
individually, and the estate. The appeals court stated that claims against
an estate must be brought against the personal representative in order for
the trial court to "have jurisdiction to enter a judgment."'"14 The court
added, however, that a judgment against an estate may not be void if the
personal representative appears or participates in the suit in the capacity
as personal representative."15 The decedent's husband participated in the
suit as an individual defendant, but the record did not reveal that he par-
ticipated as executor, nor that he entered an appearance as executor.
B. CREDITORS
In Woodward v. Jaster,"16 the court held that the sale of a decedent's
real property in order to pay debts of estate administration extinguished a
lien placed upon the real property by the beneficiary's creditor.' 17 The
decedent's holographic will did not name an executor, so her son quali-
fied as independent administrator. The decedent divided her estate be-
tween her son and a trust for the benefit of her daughter. Several months
107. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 33.41(a) (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1998) (providing that the
county in which the real property lies has jurisdiction over suits for foreclosure of tax
liens).
108. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 5(c), 5(e), 5A (Vernon Supp. 1998).
109. See Estate of Crawford, 933 S.W.2d at 729.
110. See id. at 729-30. The court noted that the personal representatives of estates
know the location of real property, whereas the taxing authorities have no method of de-
termining the county in which the probate of a deceased property owner is pending, thus
the burden for the taxing authorities is greater than the burden for the personal represen-
tative. See id. at 730.
111. See id. at 731. The city apparently named only the estate as a party to the foreclo-
sure suit. The executor filed a general denial, in which he did not raise the issue that the
estate was not a legal entity. The court held that the executor must have specifically stated
the defect in parties in his verified answer to preserve the error. See id.
112. 937 S.W.2d 8 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ).
113. See id. at 10-11.
114. Id. at 10.
115. See id.
116. 933 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, no writ).
117. See id. at 781.
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following the decedent's death, the son had paid her debts and distrib-
uted most of the cash in the estate. The decedent's daughter suspected
her brother's actions, however, and hired an attorney to remove her
brother as independent administrator. This action resulted in additional
costs for the estate, as well as legal fees for the daughter. The daughter
failed to pay her legal fees, and her attorney obtained a judgment against
her and filed the abstract of judgment against certain real property allo-
cated to the daughter's trust, although not yet distributed to the trustee.
The additional expenses the son incurred in connection with the removal
action necessitated the sale of the real property, which he conveyed to
third parties. The Woodwards' attorney brought an action against the
administrator, the purchasers, and the trustee, requesting the court to
find that the lien still existed and seeking foreclosure of the lien. The trial
court denied relief to the attorney and entered sanctions against him for
bringing the action in bad faith. On appeal, the court first determined
that the attorney had a valid lien against the property at the time he filed
the abstract of judgment.118 The court then determined that the adminis-
trator had a right and obligation to sell the decedent's property to pay
debts and estate administration expenses, and that the administrator's
right and obligation is superior to a beneficiary's vested interest in the
estate property.1 19
In Texas Commerce Bank v. Geary,1 20 the court held that Probate Code
section 306121 applies to independent administrations 122 and that the
creditor elected preferred debt and lien status by not taking other action
within six months of the date the probate court granted letters testamen-
tary. 123 The decedent, individually and in his capacity of president of a
corporation, executed a loan modification agreement on a note secured
by a lien on real property. The decedent later died and the probate court
granted letters testamentary in October 1991. The corporation filed for
bankruptcy eleven months later and the holder of the note foreclosed on
the property the next year, after the bankruptcy court confirmed the cor-
poration's reorganization plan. The foreclosure sale resulted in a defi-
ciency. In October 1993, the probate court converted the administration
from independent to dependent and appointed the former executor as
dependent administrator. The holder of the note then asserted a claim
against the decedent's estate for the deficiency on the note. The trial
118. See id. at 781. The court found that the attorney properly abstracted the judgment
against the trustee of the daughter's trust, which had a vested interest in the property
under the decedent's will. See id. The court thus found that the attorney had a valid lien
against the property at the time he abstracted the judgment. See id.
119. See id. The court stated that "[i]f the beneficiary's interest can be divested by a
sale to pay debts of the estate, it follows that the sale by the administrator extinguishes any
lien against the beneficiary's interest in the property." Id. at 782.
120. 938 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997), rev'd, (Tex. Apr. 14, 1998) (opinion not
available as of date of publication).
121. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 306 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
122. See Texas Commerce Bank, 938 S.W.2d at 208-09.
123. Id. at 212.
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court granted summary judgment for the administrator's denial of the
claim. The appeals court analyzed the interaction of Probate Code sec-
tion 146124 with Probate Code section 306125 and held that section 306
applies to independent administrations. 126 The court then held that the
holder of the note, by not making a claim or an election within six months
of the date the court appointed the independent executor and authorized
letters testamentary, effectively elected to have the debt treated as a pre-
ferred debt and lien. 127 The dissent would have held that Probate Code
section 306128 does not apply to independent administrations. 129
C. INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATIONS
In D'Unger v. De Pena,130 the Texas Supreme Court held that the pro-
bate court abused its discretion when it refused to release funds held in its
registry to the independent executor, who replaced a dependent adminis-
trator. 131 The probate court appointed a dependent administrator of the
decedent's estate because of a will contest. All interested parties later
agreed to the probate of the will, and the court admitted the will to pro-
bate and appointed the independent executor named in the will. The ex-
ecutor applied for the release of funds held in the registry of the court.
The probate court denied the executor's request because it had not ap-
proved the dependent administrator's final account and could not dis-
charge the dependent administrator pursuant to Probate Code section
221(d). 132 The executor sought a writ of mandamus, which the court of
appeals originally granted, then denied. The Supreme Court found that
the probate court could not withhold estate property from the independ-
ent executor. 133 In addition, the Court found that the dependent admin-
124. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 146 (Vernon 1980) (providing that an independent exec-
utor must satisfy claims against the estate as provided in other sections of the Probate
Code).
125. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 306(a) (Vernon 1980). This rule provides that a secured
creditor has two options for the classification and priority of its claim: treatment of the
claim as a matured secured claim, or treatment as a preferred debt and lien. If the creditor
makes no election as to treatment or files no claim within six months from the date the
court grants letters testamentary, the claim automatically becomes a preferred debt and
lien. See id. §§ 298(a), 306(b). The six month rule was amended after the date of the trial
by Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 1054, § 9, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 5207, 5210.
126. See Geary, 938 S.W.2d at 208. The court, after analyzing the decision in Bunting v.
Pearson, 430 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1968), held that TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 146 (Vernon
1980) specifically mandates that section 306 applies to independent administrations. See
938 S.W.2d at 210.
127. See Geary, 938 S.W.2d at 212. If a creditor elects preferred debt and lien status,
the creditor has the advantage of having priority over all other claims to the extent of its
collateral, but cannot collect any deficiency from other estate assets, TEX. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 306(a)(2), (c) (Vernon Supp. 1998). The court held that the trial court properly
denied the holder's motion for summary judgment. See 938 S.W.2d at 212.
128. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 306 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
129. See Geary, 938 S.W.2d at 215-19 (Maloney, J., dissenting).
130. 931 S.W.2d 533 (Tex. 1996).
131. See id. at 534-35.
132. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 221(d) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
133. See D'Unger, 931 S.W.2d at 534.
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istration ceased when the probate court appointed the independent
executor and authorized letters testamentary, even though the probate
court had not yet discharged the dependent administrator.13 4 The Court
also found that the probate court had no statutory authority to retain the
funds in the court's registry and thus abused its discretion by failing to
release the funds to the independent executor.135
In Olguin v. Jungman,136 the court determined that Probate Code sec-
tion 78137 applies to the appointment of independent executors, 38 but
that a potential conflict of interest between the fiduciary roles of in-
dependent executor of one estate and testamentary trustee under the will
of another decedent does not necessarily result in the unsuitability of the
person to serve as independent executor.139 Dr. Brunner, in his will, cre-
ated a charitable remainder trust for the benefit of Ms. Flores during her
lifetime. Ms. Flores left most of her estate to her daughter. The same
attorney drafted both the Brunner and Flores wills, and both testators
named the same executor, who also served as trustee of the testamentary
trust created under the Brunner will. The executor of the Flores will dis-
covered that her estate did not have the liquidity to pay her debts and, in
his capacity as executor of the Flores will, sought the return of an auto-
mobile that Flores left her daughter. The daughter believed that her
mother's estate should have sufficient liquidity to pay debts and ques-
tioned distributions that the executor, in his role as trustee of the charita-
ble remainder trust, paid to her mother during the trust term. The
daughter then questioned the grant of letters testamentary to the named
executor. The daughter contended that the trial court should have found
that the named executor was unsuitable to serve as independent executor
under Probate Code section 78(e). 140 The appeals court first found that
Probate Code section 78141 applies to the appointment of independent
executors.1 42 The court then found that the daughter did not prove that
the trial court abused its discretion in appointing the independent execu-
tor merely by showing that the independent executor might have a con-
flict of interest between his roles as testamentary trustee of the Brunner
trust and independent executor of the Flores will. 143
The court in Estate of Riggins,144 upheld sanctions against co-executors
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. 931 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ).
137. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 78 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
138. See Olguin, 931 S.W.2d at 609.
139. See id. at 610.
140. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 78(e) (Vernon Supp. 1998) (providing that a court may
disqualify a person from serving as executor if the court finds that person unsuitable).
141. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 78 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
142. See Olguin, 931 S.W.2d at 609.
143. See id. at 610. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by failing to require the independent executor to post a bond or, by failing to disqualify the
attorney from representing the executor because he also represented the executor in con-
nection with both the Brunner trust. See id. at 611.
144. 937 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996, writ denied).
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for discovery abuses. 145 The co-executors, who were brothers and the
sole beneficiaries under their mother's will, filed suit against their sister
for forging checks on their mother's account. The sister then filed a will
contest, alleging undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity. The
brothers failed to respond to discovery requests in a timely manner and,
when they did respond, the responses were incomplete. The co-executors
alleged that their untimely, incomplete responses were due to the illness
of their attorney. The trial court heard three motions for sanctions, first
granting no sanctions, then striking all witnesses but the co-executors
when they still did not comply with discovery requests, then striking one
of the co-executors as a witness when the co-executors still failed to com-
ply with discovery requests. The trial court subsequently withdrew the
will from probate. The former co-executors appealed, alleging that the
trial court abused its discretion in granting sanctions against them, which
resulted in their inability to present evidence favorable to their cause
upon trial of the issues. The appeals court held that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion and that the severity of the sanctions related directly
to discovery abuses. 146
In Sammons v. Elder,147 the court held that independent executors who
are also named beneficiaries under the will do not lack legal capacity to
perform their fiduciary duties as executors.148 The testator named her
two children as independent co-executors of her will. The testator left
her two children all of her savings accounts and savings certificates, and
left her residuary estate equally to her two children and her step-daugh-
ter. The step-daughter questioned the co-executors' characterization of
accounts as savings accounts and savings certificates and filed a will con-
struction suit, in which she also sought removal of the co-executors on
grounds including gross misconduct and mismanagement of the estate
and lack of legal capacity to serve. The trial court did not remove the co-
executors. The appeals court first found that the step-daughter did not
prove that the co-executors breached their fiduciary duties and commit-
ted gross misconduct or mismanagement of the estate.149 The court then
held that the co-executors did not lack legal capacity to serve merely be-
cause they were also beneficiaries under the will. 150
In Vinson & Elkins v. Moran,15' the court held that status as a succes-
sor administrator or as a co-executor of an estate does not give the suc-
cessor administrator or co-executor the right to assign a legal malpractice
145. See id. at 21.
146. See id.
147. 940 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, writ denied). For a discussion of other
issues in this case, see supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
148. See id. at 284.
149. See id. at 283. The court found that the step-daughter made many allegations con-
cerning the conduct of the co-executors, but that some of the allegations were without
merit and the step-daughter failed to prove the other allegations. See id.
150. See id. at 284.
151. 946 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ dism'd by agr.).
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claim against the attorneys who represented the co-executors. 152 The tes-
tator named three co-executors, two of which were family members and
one of which was a bank. The attorneys who drafted the will served as
initial attorneys for the estate, but withdrew after the bank hired another
law firm to handle a will construction suit and questions arose concerning
drafting errors. The law firm engaged by the bank became the attorneys
for the co-executors. The law firm had a close relationship with the bank
that resulted in numerous conflicts of interest, many of which resulted in
detriment to the estate and its beneficiaries. The law firm failed to dis-
close the conflicts of interest to the two individual co-executors and the
estate beneficiaries. Eventually the three co-executors were involved in a
lawsuit between themselves involving the sale of one of the estate's busi-
ness. The law firm continued to work for the estate, but stated that it
could not represent any of the co-executors. The law firm, however, sug-
gested counsel for the bank and worked with the bank's counsel in con-
nection with the suit. The co-executors finally settled the lawsuit and a
second bank replaced the original co-executors. All of the beneficiaries
released the original co-executors, as well as all attorneys who repre-
sented the co-executors in connection with the lawsuit. No one released
the law firm who represented the estate, however, and some of the bene-
ficiaries wished to pursue legal malpractice claims against the law firm.
Other beneficiaries did not wish to pursue malpractice claims against the
law firm and they assigned their claims to other family members. One of
the original co-executors assigned his claim. The jury found that the law
firm was negligent, breached its fiduciary duty, and conspired against the
estate. The trial court entered a large judgment against the law firm in
favor of the two family members individually and as assignees. The ap-
peals court held that no one may assign legal malpractice claims for pub-
lic policy reasons. 153 The court then held that the successor administrator
could not assign the estate's claim, although it could have itself brought
the claim on behalf of the estate. 154 The court likewise held that a co-
executor could not assign a claim, although he himself could have
brought the claim against the law firm.155
V. GUARDIANSHIPS
A. JURISDICTION
In DB Entertainment, Inc. v. Windle,1 56 the court held that Probate
Code section 608157 does not give a statutory probate court authority to
152. See id. at 398.
153. See id. at 394-95.
154. See id. at 398.
155. See id. The court stated that "[w]hen the assignment is invalid as a matter of law,
the status of the assignor is irrelevant." Id.
156. 927 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, orig. proceeding [leave denied]).
157. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 608 (Vernon Supp. 1996) (providing that a statutory
probate court may transfer to itself a "cause of action appertaining to or incident to a
guardianship estate" that is pending in another court).
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transfer a wrongful death cause of action from district court to the statu-
tory probate court. 158 The mother of the two minor wards filed a wrong-
ful death cause of action on her own behalf and as next friend for the two
children. The mother initially filed the wrongful death cause of action in
district court in Denton County, but she later agreed to a transfer of
venue to Tarrant County. Several months after the transfer of the case to
Tarrant County, the mother filed for guardianship of her two minor chil-
dren. After the statutory probate court in Denton County appointed the
mother as guardian for her two children, she filed motions with the pro-
bate court to transfer the wrongful death suit to the probate court. The
statutory probate court granted the guardian's motions and transferred
the wrongful death suit to itself. The defendants in the wrongful death
suit sought a writ of mandamus, alleging that the probate court had no
authority to transfer the suit, entered a void order, and abused its discre-
tion in granting the transfer. The court found that, pursuant to Probate
Code section 607(C), 1 59 a statutory probate court has concurrent jurisdic-
tion with a district court in all actions brought by or against a guardian in
his or her capacity as guardian, regardless of whether the cause of action
appertains to or is incident to the guardianship estate.160 The court deter-
mined, however, that Probate Code section 608161 provides that a statu-
tory probate court may only transfer to itself causes of action
appertaining to or incident to a guardianship estate, not all actions
brought by or against the guardian acting in his or her capacity as guard-
ian.162 The court found that the statutory probate court had no authority
to transfer the wrongful death action to itself.163
In Milton v. Herman,164 the court held that a statutory probate court
had no authority to transfer to itself a divorce proceeding and the parent-
child proceeding that accompanied the divorce from district court.165 The
ward and his wife married in 1991 and had one child. The ward became
incompetent in 1995, and his wife later sought a guardianship for him.
After her appointment as guardian, the wife filed for divorce in district
court and requested custody of their child. The wife, resigned as guardian
the next day. The probate court appointed the attorney ad litem for the
ward as his guardian and authorized the new guardian to hire an attorney
to represent the ward's interests in the divorce. The probate court or-
dered the transfer of the divorce and parent-child action from district
court to the probate court. The wife requested the district court to enjoin
the transfer of the proceedings to the probate court, and the district court
158. See Windle, 927 S.W.2d at 289.
159. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 607(c) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
160. See Windle, 927 S.W.2d at 287.
161. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 608 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
162. See Windle, 927 S.W.2d at 287.
163. See id. at 288. The court added that, even if the statutory probate court had the
authority to transfer the wrongful death action to itself, it abused its discretion in doing so
because venue was proper in Tarrant County. See id.
164. 947 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, orig. proceeding).
165. See id. at 742.
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obtained the agreement of the parties not to transfer the proceedings un-
til the appeals court determined whether the probate court had authority
to transfer the proceedings. The appeals court found that the divorce and
parent-child proceedings involved issues other than those concerning the
guardianship estate and, consequently, the divorce action and related par-
ent-child proceeding were not "appertaining to or incident to" the guardi-
anship estate.166 The court held that Probate Code section 608167 did not
grant the probate court authority to transfer to itself a matter not apper-
taining to or incident to the estate. 168
B. GUARDIAN AND WARD
In Coleson v. Bethan,169 the court held that a trial court may remove an
attorney ad litem the trial court had appointed if the trial court follows
proper procedures and makes a record that shows the justification for the
removal and appointment of another attorney ad litem. 170 The parents of
a minor ward applied to be named the guardians of his estate and the trial
court appointed an attorney ad litem to represent the minor in connec-
tion with the application for appointment of guardian. The court ap-
pointed both parents as the guardians of the ward, but the mother later
resigned. The trial court never dismissed the ad litem following the ap-
pointment of the guardians. The ad litem pointed out the parents' failure
to post bond and file annual accounts in a timely manner on several occa-
sions, which led to conflict between the ad litem and the parents. The
parents filed a motion to have the ad litem removed in 1994 based upon
the conflict between them, but the court denied the motion and found
that retaining the ad litem was in the best interest of the guardianship
estate. After further acrimony between the guardian's attorney and the
ad litem, the court removed the ad litem without a hearing. The court's
order recited that the court acted on its own motion after considering the
acrimony between the guardian and the ad litem and reviewing the file.
The court removed the ad litem and appointed another ad litem because
the court found that a continual need for an ad litem existed. The ad
litem appealed his removal, alleging that the court should not have re-
moved him based on communications with the guardian's attorney and
without notice and a hearing.
The appeals court found that the trial court should have discharged the
ad litem when the guardians qualified, but because the ad litem received
no discharge, he had the continuing responsibility to represent the ward's
interest when the guardian failed to file annual accounts in a timely man-
ner.171 The court also held that the trial court should have given notice to
166. Id. at 741.
167. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 608 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
168. See Milton, 947 S.W.2d at 741-42. The court also held that the probate court's
exercise of pendent jurisdiction would not promote judicial economy. See id. at 742.
169. 931 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, no writ).
170. See id. at 713-14.
171. See id. at 711.
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the ad litem of the hearing on his removal. 172 The appeals court stated
that the only manner of creating a record that supported removal of the
ad litem was by holding a hearing.173
In Hardeman v. Judge,174 the court held that a guardian may abandon
the ward's homestead rights if doing so serves the ward's best interests.
175
The ward, an elderly woman, lived on her family farm until she was un-
able to continue to live on her own. The guardian, the ward's daughter,
applied to the court to allow the guardian to sell the family farm, which
was homestead property. Although the guardian rented the house on the
property and rented out the farm for pasture, the income generated, to-
gether with the ward's other income, was insufficient to pay the ward's
living and medical bills. The guardian had a buyer willing to pay a signifi-
cant sum for the property, which would provide adequate funds to pay
the ward's expenses. The ward's son and his daughter, who were the
named beneficiaries of the ward's last will, contested the motion to sell
the property, but the trial court entered an order approving the sale. The
son and granddaughter appealed. The appeals court found that the
guardian had the power to sell the property to provide for the ward's
living and medical expenses, even if the sale eliminated the ward's ability
to make a gift of the property to the beneficiaries named in her will. 1
76
VI. INTER VIVOS GIFTS
In Dorman v. Arnold,177 the court held that the alleged donor evi-
denced no intent to make an inter vivos gift. 17 8 The decedent, whose
three daughters survived him, had some inability to manage his affairs.
His sister served as the decedent's Social Security representative and han-
dled his financial affairs for several years prior to the decedent's death.
Several months prior to his death, the decedent's sister withdrew the de-
cedent's funds in his savings account and placed them in a new account in
her name. The sister used the funds withdrawn from the decedent's ac-
count to pay for his living and funeral expenses. The daughters at-
tempted to collect the funds in the savings account and learned that the
sister held the remaining funds. The daughters filed an application for
determination of heirship. The sister filed suit for declaratory judgment
that the decedent gave the funds to her. In a cross-action, the daughters
alleged that the sister converted the decedent's funds and requested an
accounting. The trial court determined that the funds belonged to the
sister. The appeals court found that evidence the sister presented con-
172. See id. at 712. The court found that notice was proper whether the trial court
brought the removal on its own motion or the guardian's counsel requested the removal.
See id.
173. See id.
174. 931 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ denied).
175. See id. at 719.
176. See id.
177. 932 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, no writ).
178. See id. at 228.
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cerning the purported gift was insufficient to prove that the decedent had
the intent to make a present gift, and the evidence instead showed that
the decedent desired for the funds in the savings account to remain his
during his lifetime.179 The court also found no evidence that the dece-
dent intended to make a gift causa mortis of the funds to his sister.180 The
court held that, because the decedent's statements concerning the funds
evidenced a testamentary intent, the funds belonged to his estate at his
death and passed under the laws of descent and distribution to his
heirs. 181
In Eversole v. Williams,182 the court held that a remainder interest
vested in the life beneficiary's children on the date of the deed creating
the life estate.183 The grantors executed a deed in 1933, in which they
conveyed a life estate in certain real property to their daughter. The deed
specified that the life tenant's children would hold the remainder inter-
ests. The life tenant had three children at the time her parents granted
her the life estate. One of the life tenant's children died in 1958, leaving
his estate equally to his mother, father, sister, and brother. The life ten-
ant's husband died in 1972, leaving his entire estate to the life tenant.
The life tenant's daughter died in 1991, leaving her estate, by intestacy, to
her only child. The life tenant died in 1994, and her surviving son died
soon thereafter, leaving his estate to his four children. Prior to his death
the surviving son filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking a construc-
tion of the deed. He contended that the remainder interest did not vest
until the life tenant's death and that he should receive fee simple title to
all the property as her sole surviving child. The daughter of the second
child to die filed a motion for summary judgment, requesting the court to
find either that the deed constituted a restraint on alienation, so that it
conveyed a fee simple interest to the life tenant, or that the remainder
interests vested at the time of the deed. Under either theory, the daugh-
ter of the deceased child would receive one-half of the real property. The
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the daughter of the
deceased child and declared that she owned one-half of the real property
and the children of the surviving son equally owned the other one-half.
The appeals court found that the deed does not require a child to survive
the life tenant in order to have an interest in the real property, but merely
postpones the child's right to possess and enjoy the property until after
179. See id. The sister herself testified that the decedent told her that he wanted her to
have the remaining funds when he died. The appeals court found that this testimony was
the evidence most favorable to the sister's contention, but that it did not demonstrate the
decedent's intent to make a gift to his sister during his lifetime. See id.
180. See id. 228-29. The court noted that a gift causa mortis requires a present donative
intent, which the decedent did not demonstrate. See id. at 229.
181. See id. at 229. The court also reversed the award of attorney's fees to the sister
because the trial court awarded the fees on the basis that the sister was the prevailing
party, which was clearly erroneous. See id. The concurring opinion added that no gift
occurred because no evidence of delivery of the gift existed. See id. at 229-30 (Grant, J.,
concurring).
182. 943 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ).
183. See id. at 144.
1308 [Vol. 51
PROBATE AND TRUSTS
the life tenant's death. 184
VII. TRUSTS
A. TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
In Lemke v. Lemke, 185 the court held that the wife of a trust's benefici-
ary had no standing to challenge the trust's validity.18 6 Several years
prior to marriage the husband received a large medical malpractice settle-
ment, which he placed in trust. The husband was the sole beneficiary of
the trust, and a third party served as trustee. The trustee had discretion
to distribute income and principal to or for the benefit of the husband for
health, support, maintenance and education needs. The husband and
wife married, then separated only a few months later. During the divorce
proceedings the wife contended that the husband could not have created
the trust because he did not have capacity to do so and that she had a
community property interest in some or all of the assets of the trust. The
trial court found that all of the assets of the trust, including its income,
were the separate property of the husband. The appeals court held that
any undistributed trust income was the husband's separate property. 187
The court then held that the wife was not an interested person as defined
in Property Code section 111.004(7),188 thus she did not have standing to
contest the validity of the trust.18 9 The court also held that the trust was
not an indispensable party to the divorce action.' 90
In Wils v. Robinson,'9' the court held that a grantor could not termi-
nate an irrevocable trust pursuant to Property Code section
112.054(a)(2) 192 because the grantor retained a testamentary power of
appointment and because the spendthrift provisions of the trust did not
apply.' 93 The grantor executed the trust agreement in connection with
the settlement of a family dispute. At the time the grantor executed the
agreement, he was a mentally competent adult. The grantor received in-
come from the trust for several years. The grantor also sued the initial
trustee, who was the grantor's attorney during the family dispute, which
resulted in a settlement and court appointment of a successor trustee.
Eight years after the grantor created the trust and two years after he sued
the trustee, the grantor sought to terminate the trust. The trial court ter-
minated and rescinded the trust. The attorney ad litem appointed to rep-
resent the unborn and unascertained beneficiaries of the trust, appealed,
184. See id.
185. 929 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ denied).
186. See id. at 664.
187. See id.
188. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 111.004(7) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
189. See Lemke, 929 S.W.2d at 664.
190. See id. at 665.
191. 934 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.], writ dism'd by agr.).
192. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.054(a)(2) (Vernon 1995) (allowing for the termina-
tion of a trust if its purposes cannot be met due to unforeseen circumstances).
193. See Wils, 934 SW.2d at 779.
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contending that the court should not have terminated the trust and that
the court erred in rescinding the trust upon grounds the grantor did not
plead or prove.
The appeals court examined the trust agreement and determined that
the trust was irrevocable. 194 The appeals court then found that even
though the grantor may not have known that he was creating the trust, he
could still receive the income during his lifetime and the principal could
still be distributed to the remainder beneficiaries following the grantor's
death, so following the terms of the trust would not defeat its purposes. 195
The ad litem also alleged that the trial court erred by rescinding the trust
based upon undue influence. The grantor pled undue influence in the
creation of the trust, but the appeals court found that the grantor did not
prove that his attorney unduly influenced him to create the trust.1 96 The
appeals court also found that the grantor should not be granted an equi-
table rescission of the trust since he accepted benefits under the trust.197
In Cleaver v. Cleaver,198 the court held that the wife's beneficial inter-
est in a trust was her separate property, 99 but that interest earned on
undistributed income was community property.200 The wife's father died
when she was thirteen and established a testamentary trust for her bene-
fit. The trust required distributions of income to the wife after she
reached age twenty-one. The wife's children were the remainder benefi-
ciaries of the trust. The wife had no interest in trust corpus. The trust
owned a small percentage in the stock of two corporations. The corpora-
tions made few distributions to its shareholders, but instead retained
earnings for expansion. The husband, while admitting that the wife's in-
terest in the trust was her separate property, complained that she did not
prove the separate property characteristics of her beneficial interest by
clear and convincing evidence. The appeals court disagreed.201 The hus-
band next alleged that the earnings on undistributed income retained in
the corporations and in a partnership in which the trust also held an inter-
est were commingled and constituted community property. The appeals
court again disagreed, finding that no commingling of community and
separate funds occurred in the partnership because partnership funds be-
long to the partnership entity, not to the partners, and thus do not have
community or separate characteristics.202 The court likewise found that
the corporate retained earnings were the property of the corporation, not
194. See id. at 777.
195. See id. at 779.
196. See id. at 780-81.
197. See id. at 783. The court also found that the grantor did not challenge the exist-
ence of the trust when he sought removal of the trustee, which also mitigated against equi-
table rescission. See id.
198. 935 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1996, no writ).






the shareholders. 20 3 The trustee failed to distribute some income to the
wife and the court held that, to the extent any interest had accrued on the
undistributed income, the interest was community property subject to
division.204
In Hoenig v. Texas Commerce Bank,20 5 the court held that a predeces-
sor trustee breached its fiduciary duty2 0 6 and thus was liable for resulting
damages.207 The testator, as lessor, leased real property fronting on two
streets for a primary term of five years with two five-year renewal terms.
The lessee subleased the original retail spaces that fronted on one of the
streets and added improvements to the property fronting the other street,
subleasing those spaces as well. The testator died two years after she
entered the lease agreement with the lessee. The testator appointed a
local bank as trustee of her testamentary trust, and the bank assumed the
lessor's rights and responsibilities under the lease. The bank apparently
never was aware that the property to which the lessee had made improve-
ments was part of the trust estate. At approximately the same time as the
second renewal term of the lease expired, the appellee solicited trust
business from the original trustee, including the trust holding the real
property. The original trustee did not negotiate a new lease with the
lessee and notified him that the lease had expired by its terms. The origi-
nal trustee notified the tenants of the storefronts facing one street to
make all future rent payments to it. The original trustee did not contact
the tenants of the spaces facing the other street since it was unaware that
the property was part of the trust estate. The subtenants continued mak-
ing rent payments to the lessee, whose lease had expired. Late that year,
the court named appellant as successor trustee. The appellant assumed
administration of the trust approximately four months later. Shortly after
assuming its duties appellant discovered that the spaces facing the second
street were part of the trust property. The appellant took action to stop
the lessee from collecting rent payments. The lessee had collected the
rent for almost a year and a half after his lease had expired.
The appellant sued the lessee and the original trustee for recovery of
the loss of rentals. The trial court found that the original trustee's negli-
gence in failing to discover the property and in preventing the lessee's
conversion of the rent payments made it liable. The original trustee ap-
pealed, asserting that its acts and omissions did not rise to the level of
"culpable" negligence, so it could not be liable for any breach of duty.
The testator's will stated that the trustee would not be liable for any loss
to the trust estate unless it acted either with "culpable negligence," or
intentionally. The trial court interpreted the term "culpable negligence"
as ordinary negligence rather than gross negligence. The appeals court
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. 939 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ).
206. See id. at 661.
207. See id. at 662.
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agreed.208 The original trustee also complained that it should not be held
liable, even under an ordinary negligence standard, for its failure to dis-
cover all of the trust property since the lessee's actions were intentional.
The appeals court held that the lessee's intentional misconduct was a
foreseeable result of the original trustee's negligence in failing to account
for all trust assets, so the trustee could not escape liability because of the
lessee's intentional actions. 20 9 The court also found that the trial court
properly found a breach of trust when the original trustee failed to dis-
cover the extent of trust property and collect income from the prop-
erty.210 The appeals court held that the original trustee was jointly and
severally liable with the lessee for the lost revenues. 211 The original
trustee attempted to persuade the appeals court that the successor trustee
was also negligent for failure to discover the property. The court found
first that the successor trustee, under the terms of the judgment ap-
pointing the successor trustee, specifically had no liability for acts or
omissions that occurred during the tenure of the original trustee.212 The
court then found that the successor trustee quickly discovered that the
property was part of the trust estate, while the original trustee never dis-
covered the extent of the trust property, which provided sufficient evi-
dence to support the trial court's ruling that the successor trustee was not
negligent. 213
In Burns v. Miller, Hiersche, Martens & Hayward, P.C.,214 the court
held that the assets held in a spendthrift trust were exempt from a turno-
ver order. 215 The appellant was the beneficiary of spendthrift trusts cre-
ated under his parents' wills. The trustee of each trust had discretion to
make distributions for the beneficiary's support and maintenance. The
beneficiary had a judgment entered against him. The successor in interest
to the judgment creditor requested the court to require the beneficiary to
turn over property to satisfy the judgment. The trial court ordered the
beneficiary to turn over disbursements from the trusts to the judgment
creditor and to direct the trustees to make all future distributions to a
receiver. On appeal the court held that the assets held in the spendthrift
trusts were exempt from a court-ordered turnover.216 The court also held
that the trial court did not order turnover of trust assets by ordering the
beneficiary to notify the trustees to make all future distributions to the
receiver. 217 The court further held, however, that distributions from the
208. See id. at 660.
209. See id. at 661.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 662. The court also held that the trial court did not err in its award of
attorney's fees against the original trustee. See id.
212. See id.
213. See id. at 663.
214. 948 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, writ denied).





spendthrift trusts were exempt from turnover orders.218
B. CHARITABLE TRUSTS
In Baywood Country Club v. Estep,219 the court held that the cy pres
doctrine did not apply to prevent the dissolution of a country club corpo-
ration and distribution of corporate assets to the members.220 Humble
Oil and Refining Company deeded acreage to Humble Recreation Club,
a nonprofit, non-stock corporation formed to provide recreational facili-
ties to employees of Humble Oil. The club changed its name on two sub-
sequent occasions and also amended its articles of incorporation to
provide for the issuance of stock. A majority of the stockholders deter-
mined to dissolve the corporation in 1993, but the officers of the corpora-
tion resisted the dissolution and refused to call a special meeting for
purposes of discussing the dissolution. The members sued the corpora-
tion, requesting injunctive relief as well as actual and exemplary damages.
The officers argued, among other things, that the cy pres doctrine pre-
vented the dissolution of the corporation and distribution of its assets.
The trial court granted injunctive relief for the members. The officers
appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in not applying the cy pres
doctrine. The appeals court held that the trial court did not err because
the cy pres doctrine only applies in connection with a public charity, not
to a private organization with a limited number of members. 221
C. CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST
In Sever v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance,222 the court held that
the imposition of a constructive trust on life insurance proceeds was
proper when the decedent failed to comply with the order in his divorce
decree to acquire an insurance policy naming his child as the benefici-
ary.2 23 The decedent named his wife as beneficiary of his life insurance
policy, but failed to change the designation after their divorce. The dece-
dent had named no contingent beneficiary. The decedent apparently dis-
cussed changing the designation with his agent, but he never signed a new
beneficiary designation form. In the divorce decree, the court ordered
the decedent to purchase a $50,000 policy naming the child as the benefi-
ciary. The divorce decree also awarded the decedent all existing policies
on his life. The decedent never purchased the $50,000 policy for his
daughter. The decedent was unmarried at the time of his death and he
apparently died intestate. No administration of the decedent's estate was
pending when the insurance company filed its interpleader action. The
trial court imposed a constructive trust for the benefit of the daughter
218. See id. at 323.
219. 929 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied).
220. See id. at 538.
221. See id.
222. 944 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1997, writ denied).
223. See id. at 492.
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over the proceeds to the extent of $50,000 and awarded the remaining
proceeds to the decedent's ex-wife. The daughter, through her attorney
ad litem, appealed, contending that the trial court improperly awarded
the bulk of the insurance proceeds to her mother, the decedent's ex-wife,
and in imposing a constructive trust, rather than a legal trust, over
$50,000 of the proceeds. The appeals court held that no evidence existed
that the decedent redesignated his ex-wife as beneficiary of the policy
after their divorce so that all policy proceeds other than the $50,000 and
amounts paid in attorney's fees inured to the estate of the decedent.22 4
The court held that the imposition of a constructive trust, rather than a
legal trust, was appropriate since no evidence existed that the daughter's
mother was unsuitable to serve as constructive trustee.225
VIII. LEGISLATIVE UPDATE
A. WILLS
The Legislature added new Probate Code section 58b to provide that,
except for certain close family relationships, bequests or devises to the
attorney who prepared or supervised the preparation of a will, or to an
heir or employee of the attorney who prepared or supervised the prepa-
ration of a will, are void.226 The Legislature amended Probate Code sec-
tion 69(a) to clarify that a bequest to a former spouse will be read as if
the spouse predeceased the testator.2 27
B. ESTATE ADMINISTRATION
1. Probate Courts
The Legislature attempted to clarify that county courts at law exercis-
ing probate jurisdiction are not statutory probate courts unless chapter 25
of the Government Code 228 designates the court as a statutory probate
court.22 9 The Legislature amended Probate Code section 5A(b) in an at-
tempt to clarify what actions are appertaining to or incident to an
224. See id. at 490-91.
225. See id. at 492. The court noted that the mother had preference to serve as guard-
ian for the child if a guardianship were necessary. See id.
226. See Act of May 30, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1054, § 1, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
4016, 4016 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 58b (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
227. See § Act of May 22, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1302, § 5, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
4954, 4955-56 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 69(a) (Vernon
Supp. 1998)).
228. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 25.0173, 25.0591, 25.0631, 25.0731, 25.1031, 25.2221,
25.2291 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
229. See Act of Apr. 28,1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 52, § 1, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 121,
121 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 3(ii) (Vernon Supp.
1998)). See also id. § 2, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 121-22 (Vernon) (codified as amended





2. Applications for Probate
The social security numbers of the applicant and the decedent are no
longer necessary for applications for letters testamentary231 and letters of
administration. 232 The Legislature provided, however, that the court may
request the applicant to furnish the court with his or her social security
number or other identifying information, which will be retained by the
court and not made a part of the file. 233 Interestingly, the requirement
for inclusion of the applicant's and decedent's social security numbers
remains for a muniment of title application.234 The Legislature adopted
the requirements for the contents of the application for probate as a mu-
niment of title235 and the proof required for probate as a muniment of
title.2 36 An application for the appointment of a temporary administrator
must include all information required for an application for letters testa-
mentary, if the decedent died testate, or an application for letters of ad-
ministration, if the decedent died intestate.237
C. CREDITORS AND EXEMPT PROPERTY
The Legislature has provided that an unsecured creditor must give no-
tice to an independent executor within 120 days after the date on which
the creditor received notice of the appointment of the independent exec-
utor2 38 and clarified how both secured and unsecured creditors are to
give notice to independent executors.2 39 A personal representative may
now abandon worthless or burdensome property of the estate, and a se-
cured creditor may foreclose on the property without further order of the
court.2 40 The Legislature amended Probate Code sections 281241 and
230. See Act of May 22, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1302, § 1, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
4954, 4954 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5A(b) (Vernon
Supp. 1998)).
231. See Act of May 22, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1302, § 6, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
4954, 4956 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 81 (Vernon Supp.
1998)).
232. See id. § 7, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 4956 (Vernon) (codified as amended at
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 82 (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
233. See id. § 3, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 4955 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 36(b) (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
234. See Act of May 19, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 540, § 1, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
1907, 1907-09 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 89A (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
235. See id.
236. See id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 89B (Vernon Supp. 1998)). Former
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 89A has become TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 89C.
237. See id. § 2, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 1909 (codified as amended at TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 131A (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
238. See Act of May 22, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1302, § 8, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4954,
4957 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 146(d) (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
239. See id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 146(e) (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
240. See id. § 9, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 4957 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 234(a)(6) (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
241. See id. § 10, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 4957 (codified as amended at TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 281 (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
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290242 to provide that exempt property shall be liable only for Class 1
claims and the family allowance shall be paid in preference to all claims
except Class 1 claims. The Legislature has clarified the procedures for
handling secured claims, including court-ordered sales of the property
subject to the secured claims. 243 Funeral expenses and expenses of last
illness may now total fifteen thousand dollars rather than five thousand
dollars.244
D. DEPENDENT ADMINISTRATIONS
The annual account 245 and final account 246 of a dependent personal
representative must affirmatively state that the personal representative
has paid all required bond premiums.
E. MISCELLANEOUS AMENDMENTS
The Legislature repealed the informal probate provisions 247 and recod-
ified the emergency intervention procedures. 248 A small estate affidavit
must now include sufficient family history facts to establish the heirship
rights of the distributees.249 A party to a will contest or other proceeding
in which the decedent's mental or testamentary capacity is an issue may
obtain relevant medical records relating the decedent's capacity. 250 Cita-
tion of service in an heirship proceeding must be made to all heirs age
twelve and older, but may be made to the parent, managing conservator,
or guardian of an heir under twelve years of age.2 51 The legislature ex-
panded the provisions for payment or transfer on death to apply to secur-
242. See id. § 11, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 4957-58 (codified as amended at TEX.
PROB. CODE ANN. § 290 (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
243. See id. § 13, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 4958-59 (codified as amended at TEX.
PROB. CODE ANN. § 306(e)(3), (f), (i) (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
244. See Act of May 26, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1361, § 1, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
5112, 5112 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 320(a)(1) (Vernon
Supp. 1998)) (relating to order of payment of claims); see id. § 2, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
at 5112 (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 322 (Vernon Supp. 1998)) (de-
fining Class 1 claims).
245. See Act of May 29, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1403, § 1, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
5260, 5260-61 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 399(a)(9) (Vernon Supp.
1998)).
246. See id. § 2, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 5261 (codified as amended at TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 405 (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
247. See Act of May 19, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 540, § 5, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
1907, 1910 (Vernon), repealing Act of May 29, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 712, §7, 1993 Tex.
Gen. Laws 2792, 2792-96.
248. See Act of May 12, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 199, § 1, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
1066, 1066-68 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 108-115 (Vernon Supp.
1998)).
249. See Act of May 19, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 540, § 3, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
1907, 1909-10 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 137(a)(5)
(Vernon Supp. 1998)).
250. See Act of May 22, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1302, § 2, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
4954, 4955 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 10B (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
251. See Act of May 28, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1130, § 1, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
4284, 4284 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 50(a) (Vernon
Supp. 1998)). Citation by publication is proper for persons or entities whose addresses are
[Vol. 511316
PROBATE AND TRUSTS
ities and accounts at financial institutions.252
F. GUARDIANSHIPS
The Legislature amended Probate Code section 663 to require that no-
tice of a guardianship application be provided to a person designated as
guardian of the proposed ward in the event of later need, a person desig-
nated as guardian in a probated will of the parent of the proposed ward,
or a person designated as guardian of the proposed ward in a writing
executed by the proposed ward's last surviving parent.2 53 The application
for guardianship no longer needs to include the social security numbers of
the applicant and proposed ward,2 54 but the court, for its own records,
may ask the applicant for his or her social security number or other iden-
tifying information.2 55 If a court appoints the Department of Protective
and Regulatory Services as guardian, a representative of the department
shall take the guardian's oath.2 56 The Legislature has provided guidance
to the courts on the types of bonds and the considerations in determining
the types and amounts of bonds of guardians of the person. 257
The guardian's annual account2 58 and final account2 59 must now affirm-
atively state that all bond premiums have been paid. The guardian must
also include in the final account information about the tax returns filed
and taxes owed and paid during the guardianship, as well as any current
delinquencies in filing tax returns and paying taxes. 260 The guardian may
abandon worthless or burdensome property, and a secured creditor may
foreclose on the abandoned property without further court action.261 A
court may now order a guardian "to expend guardianship funds for the
unknown, as well as on unknown heirs. See id. at 4285 (codified as amended at TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 50(b) (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
252. See Act of May 22, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1302, § 14, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
4954, 4959 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 450(a) (Vernon
Supp. 1998)).
253. See Act of Apr. 29, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 77, § 2, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 158,
159 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 633(d)(5), (6), (7) (Vernon Supp.
1998)).
254. See id. § 5, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 159 (codified as amended at TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 682(3) (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
255. See id. § 3, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 159 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 671(e) (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
256. See Act of May 31, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1022, § 101, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
3733, 3777 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 700(b) (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
257. See Act of May 25, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 924, § 2, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
2918, 2919 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 702A (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
258. See Act of May 29, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1403, § 3, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
5260, 5262-63 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 743(b)(14)
(Vernon Supp. 1998)).
259. See id. § 4, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 5263 (codified as amended at TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 749(5) (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
260. See id. (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 749(6), (7), (8), (9)
(Vernon Supp. 1998)).
261. See Act of Apr. 29, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 77, § 6,1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 158,
160-61 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 774(a)(6) (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
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education and maintenance of the ward's spouse or dependent. '262 The
Legislature has provided that a guardian shall give the highest priority to
the payment of a claim relating to the guardianship administration.263 A
guardian may invest in the Texas Tomorrow Fund for a minor ward's edu-
cation.2 64 The Legislature has added parties to receive notice if the
guardian makes an application to make a tax-motivated gift on behalf of
the ward to include the beneficiaries under a trust or other beneficial
instrument, and the applicant must provide notice of the application to all
beneficiaries under the ward's will or other beneficial instrument, includ-
ing the ward's spouse, the ward's dependents, and any other person speci-
fied by the court. 265
The Legislature amended the provisions relating to management
trusts266 and added provisions relating to the appointment and duties of a
receiver for persons thought to be prisoners of war or missing in ac-
tion. 267 The Legislature also amended Probate Code section 887 to pro-
vide that up to $50,000 may be paid into the registry of the court for an
incapacitated person without a legal guardian,2 68 and provided for deliv-
ery to the registry of the court a minor's interest in real or personal prop-
erty if the interest does not exceed $50,000 in value.269 The Legislature
added a provision for the guardian's sale of property of a ward subject to
a guardianship of the person, but not a guardianship of the estate, if the
property does not exceed $50,000 in value, and for delivery of the pro-
ceeds to the registry of the court.270
G. TRUSTS
The Legislature amended Property Code section 112.035271 to add new
subsection (e), which provides that a beneficiary of a trust will not be-
come a grantor of the trust merely by waiving, releasing, or allowing the
262. See id. § 7, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 161 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 776A (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
263. See Act of May 29, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1403, § 5, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
5260, 5263 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 805(b) (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
264. See Act of May 15, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 434, § 1, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
1702, 1702 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 856(a) (Vernon
Supp. 1998)).
265. See Act of Apr. 29, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 77, § 9, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 158,
160-62 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 865(a)(2), (3), (e)
(Vernon Supp. 1998)).
266. See Act of May 26, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1375, §§ 1-4, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
5162, 5162-63 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 867-870
(Vernon Supp. 1998)).
267. See Act of April 3,1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 7, § 2,1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 8, 41-
43 (codified as TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 886, 886A-886F (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
268. See Act of May 12, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 295, § 1, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
1314, 1314-15 (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 887(a), (e) (Vernon
Supp. 1998)).
269. See id. § 2, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 1315 (codified as amended at TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 889(a) (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
270. See id. § 4, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 1315 (codified as TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 890 (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
271. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.035 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
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lapse of a Crummey demand right.272 Trustees will now have the same
protection from federal environmental laws as allowed under federal
law273 due to an addition to Property Code section 114.001.274 The Legis-
lature amended Property Code section 115.001(d) to provide jurisdiction
for a court that creates an 867 Trust.275
H. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
1. Property Code Provisions
The Legislature amended the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act to clar-
ify that donors make may contributions to Uniform Gifts to Minors Ac-
counts that existed prior to the passage of the Uniform Transfers to
Minors Accounts Act.276 The Legislature amended Property Code sec-
tion 142.005(g) to provide that a court may create a Medicaid special
needs trust 277 under section 142.278
2. Disability Planning
The Legislature revised the durable power of attorney statute to pro-
vide a new statutory form, which is only a suggested form.279 The Legis-
lature clarified that mineral interests fall under the real property powers
granted to the attorney in fact 280 and defined retirement plans for pur-
poses of a power of attorney.281 The Legislature amended witness re-
quirements on directives to physicians 282 and amended the statutory
272. See Act of April 30, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 109, § 1, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
208, 208 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.035(e) (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
273. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(n) (1994).
274. See Act of May 12, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 263, § 1, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
1213, 1213 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 114.001(e) (Vernon Supp.
1998)).
275. See Act of May 26, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1375, § 5, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
5162, 5163 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 115.001(d) (Vernon
Supp. 1998)).
276. See Act of May 7, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 221, § 2, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
1127, 1128 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 141.025 (editorially
redesignated) (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
277. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A) (1994).
278. See Act of May 2, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 128, § 1, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 250,
250 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 142.005(g) (Vernon Supp.
1998)).
279. See Act of May 16, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 455, § 4, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
1752, 1753-56 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE AN. § 490 (Vernon
Supp. 1998)). The legislature also provided for the automatic revocation of a power of
attorney given to a spouse upon divorce. See id. § 1, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 1752
(codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 485A (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
280. See id. § 5, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 1756 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 492(4)(E) (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
281. See id. § 6, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 1757 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 503(b) (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
282. See Act of May 13, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 291, § 1, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
1305, 1305-06 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ArN.
§ 672.003(c) (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
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form.283 A person not incapacitated may now, by completing a
mandatory statutory form, declare his or her wishes concerning treatment
if he or she later becomes incapacitated. 284
283. See id. § 2, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 1306-07 (codified as amended at TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.004 (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
284. See Act of May 23, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1318, § 1, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
4995, 4995-5000 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 137.001-
137.011 (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
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